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Hedge funds, credit risk transfer and ﬁ  nancial stability
Over the past decade, central bankers and ﬁ  nancial institution supervisors have sharpened their focus on 
the increasingly important role that private pools of investment funds play in global ﬁ  nancial markets. The 
growth in these pools has contributed signiﬁ  cantly to market efﬁ  ciency and ﬁ  nancial stability by expanding 
liquidity in many ﬁ  nancial markets, improving price discovery, and, ultimately, lowering the costs of capital. 
Private investment pools and the alternative investment strategies they pursue have contributed to a 
signiﬁ  cant expansion of the global markets and have helped accelerate the evolution in traded credit 
products such as credit derivatives, collateralized debt obligations, and the securitization of an increasing 
array of traditionally illiquid assets. However, because of the lack of transparency and an established 
regime of supervision of these investment vehicles, policymakers and supervisors have become concerned 
about customer protection and the potential for systemic risk. This paper discusses some of the key issues 
confronting supervisors in light of the recent growth of private investment pools and the rapid developments 
in the area of credit risk transfer, with a particular focus on the implications of these trends regarding 
systemic risk and ﬁ  nancial stability.
NB: The authors are grateful for insight provided by John Colwell, Robert Cote, James Embersit, Patrick Parkinson, and others at the Federal Reserve Board and the 
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P
rivate investment pools pursue a diverse set of 
investment strategies, and it would be useful 
at the outset to broadly differentiate between 
those that specialize in privately held investments 
(private equity funds) and those that focus primarily 
on traded instruments (hedge funds). While the lines 
between the two are increasingly blurring, such 
distinctions permit supervisors and policymakers 
to better target issues that may be of concern. 
Hedge funds, the primary focus of this symposium, 
can be deﬁ  ned as private pools of funds that invest 
in traded instruments (both cash securities and 
derivatives); can employ leverage through various 
means, including the use of short positions; and are 
generally not regulated. Their increasingly important 
role as counterparties to established investment and 
universal bank dealers, combined with the fact that 
they pursue many of the same strategies as regulated 
dealers, has given rise to increasing concerns about 
their potential for contributing to systemic risk. The 
concern is that in the event of a major ﬁ  nancial 
shock, the complex web of exposures among highly 
leveraged hedge funds and dealer institutions may 
increase the risk that problems at one ﬁ  nancial 
institution would spread to other institutions. Given 
the difﬁ  culties that would be involved in creating 
a global supervisory framework for hedge funds, 
signiﬁ  cant responsibility falls upon dealer banks that 
extend leverage to hedge funds and their supervisors. 
The risk-management processes employed by dealer 
banks are critical elements in preventing a ﬁ  nancial 
shock from spreading.
1| THE GROWING IMPORTANCE
OF HEDGE FUNDS
Over the past decade, hedge funds have grown 
rapidly in both size and importance. At the end
of 2006, they managed an estimated USD 1.426 trillion 
in assets, over 700 percent more than in 1995 
(chart 11). Hedge funds now account for a signiﬁ  cant 
share of the trading in many markets.
With that growth has come some measure of maturity.
Hedge funds were once typically small groups
of entrepreneurs; today many are large ﬁ  nancial 
institutions employing hundreds of people. In 1990, 
“macro” strategies accounted for over 70% of hedge 
fund assets; today, hedge funds invest in diverse 
asset classes and strategies, with no single strategy 
accounting for more than a third of hedge fund 
assets (chart 22).3 Even within a strategy class, hedge 
funds now use more diverse methods to select and 
manage positions. Although hedge funds can still 
take concentrated positions in a single market, this 
diversity may reduce the potential that hedge funds 
may act in concert and disrupt markets by pursuing 
similar trades, which has been one of supervisors’ 
major concerns. Academic studies have found little 
evidence that hedge funds have systematically 
caused market prices to deviate from economic 
fundamentals during major market events.4
2| CREDIT RISK TRANSFER MARKETS
The growth in assets managed by hedge funds and 
the increasing diversity of hedge funds’ strategies 
reﬂ  ect the growing importance of hedge funds in a 
wide range of ﬁ  nancial markets. Of particular interest 
is the role hedge funds play as providers of liquidity 
and the ultimate holders of risk in the dynamic and 
growing credit risk transfer markets, which include 
such products as credit derivatives, secondary loans, 
securitizations such as mortgage-backed securities, 
1  Hedge Fund Research, Inc., © HFR, Inc., January 2007, www.hedgefundresearch.com.
2  Hedge Fund Research, Ibid.
3  Macro funds attempt to identify inefﬁ  cient pricing in stock markets, interest rates, foreign exchange rates, and physical commodities.  Their top-down approach 
concentrates on understanding how global macroeconomic and political events affect the valuations of ﬁ  nancial instruments; they tend to have broad investment 
mandates that allow them to hold positions in practically any ﬁ  nancial instrument in any market.
4  Fung (W.) and Hsieh (D. A.) (2000): “Measuring the market impact of hedge funds”, Journal of Empirical Finance, vol. 7, pp. 1–36.
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and other structured credit products. As an indication 
of the increased role of hedge funds in credit risk 
transfer markets, the percentage of hedge fund 
assets categorized in strategies that usually invest in 
credit-linked assets increased from 6 percent in 
1990 to 16 percent in 2006. Hedge funds are now 
investing in assets once widely held by banks through 
lending activities.5
While commercial banks traditionally used their 
deposit base and other funding sources to ﬁ  nance, 
originate, and hold loans to maturity, today they can 
remove these loans, or the credit risk underlying these 
loans, from their balance sheets through securitization, 
the bond markets, the issuance of derivatives products, 
or outright sale on secondary loan markets. In 2006, 
a total of USD 4.6 trillion was issued in US credit 
market instruments;6 by comparison, all insured
US commercial banks had USD 9.6 trillion in assets as of 
September 2006.7 Many banks have found a successful 
business model as originators and distributors of 
credit risk, and hedge funds have stepped in as key 
buyers and holders of that credit risk. Hedge funds 
thus provide a double beneﬁ  t to banks. They reduce 
banks’ credit risks by taking assets off of their balance 
sheets, and they improve banks’ liquidity by providing 
a market for their securitizations and other ﬁ  nancing 
strategies. At the same time, of course, for banks that 
do business with them, hedge funds pose a number 
of new challenges in managing credit, market, and 
operational risk, as discussed in greater detail below.
Banks now participate in credit risk transfer 
markets in several ways. They use syndications, 
securitizations, and credit derivatives to transfer 
credit risk to other banks, allowing them to reduce 
credit concentrations and diversify their exposures. 
Banks also use these techniques to distribute 
credit risk to other investors, reducing both their 
own credit exposure and the banking system’s.
As the investment base for these credit products 
has grown, banks have become dealers in the credit 
risk transfer markets, serving as intermediaries 
between investors who are adjusting their exposures 
to various credit risks. The last category comprises 
the dealer banks, that is, investment banks,
and universal banks that make markets in traded 
credit instruments.
It is difﬁ  cult to quantify the role hedge funds have 
played in the disintermediation of commercial 
banks’ traditional lending role, since hedge funds 
are not required to report their investment holdings. 
However, US banking supervisors have some 
understanding of hedge fund activities through the 
Shared National Credit (SNC) program, an annual 
joint examination of major syndicated credits in 
the United States. According to SNC data, nonbank 
lenders (including hedge funds) have increased their 
holdings of syndicated loans in the United States 
from USD 178 billion in 2002 to USD 267 billion, 
or 14 percent of total credits, in 2006 (Table 1). 
The SNC data also suggest that hedge funds
(along with mutual funds, pension funds, and 
insurance companies) have become signiﬁ  cant 
holders of some of the riskiest assets in the ﬁ  nancial 
system: between 2002 and 2006, nonbank lenders 
5  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005): “Credit risk transfer”, March, provides an overview of the trading of credit risk.
6  Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (2007): “US market outlook”, January.
7  Call Report data.
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increased their holdings of classiﬁ  ed credits from 
27 percent to 51 percent of total classiﬁ  ed credits 
(chart 3).8 In 2006, USD 10 billion of these credits 
would have been on nonaccrual status had they been 
held by banks. Hedge funds’ willingness to hold 
high-yielding assets has clearly provided banks with 
a new way to exit risky credits.
2|1 Supervisory  concerns 
  about credit risk transfer
Although the transfer of risk from banks to hedge funds 
allows banks to better manage their credit risks, some 
supervisory issues surround this transfer. One concern 
is that this risk hasn’t been transferred so much as 
transformed into counterparty credit exposure to the 
hedge fund. For example, in the purchase of credit 
protection on a loan via a credit default swap with a 
hedge fund, a bank would no longer bear direct credit 
risk to the original borrower but would instead have 
counterparty credit risk to the hedge fund. Another 
concern is that banks that provide ﬁ  nancing to hedge 
funds may ﬁ  nd securitized assets coming back onto 
their balance sheets at inopportune times if losses on 
the securitized assets cause hedge fund failures.
Dealer banks in credit risk markets must adapt 
traditional market risk management tools to 
these markets. New credit risk instruments create 
additional challenges: for example, many credit 
derivatives require the delivery of senior debt 
instruments in the event of a default. The amount 
of senior debt that must be delivered to fulﬁ  ll 
the credit derivatives contracts can be more than 
the amount of senior debt that has been issued 
by a company. Market participants have worked 
diligently to develop an orderly process for fulﬁ  lling 
credit derivatives contracts, but the process remains 
largely untested. Dealer banks may also ﬁ  nd new 
credit instruments difﬁ  cult to price. Without liquid 
markets to provide price discovery, different dealer 
banks may value these transactions quite differently. 
As liquidity improves, banks will have to adjust and 
calibrate their pricing in these markets.
Another concern is how hedge funds will interact 
with commercial banks when it is time to restructure 
a loan with a borrower. In the past, banks that held 
loans on their balance sheets had a substantial 
ﬁ  nancial incentive to come to an amicable workout 
with borrowers. When banks securitize loans, 
however, that incentive may be diminished because 
they don’t bear as much of the risk of default. It is 
unclear whether the hedge funds that now bear those 
risks will monitor the condition of the borrower or 
seek to work out a loan with the same diligence. The 
advent of derivative technology takes this concern 
one step further: for example, hedge funds and even 
banks may proﬁ  t from a default if they have bought 
protection through a credit default swap in excess 
of the amount of the loans they hold. This concern 
must be weighed against the potential for hedge 
funds to force needed restructurings or speed up the 
decision to work out or close out the loan. The role 
of hedge funds in these situations remains unclear. 
Hedge funds may even begin to specialize in holding 
assets where workouts are anticipated.
Credit risk transfer illustrates some of the tradeoffs 
faced by supervisors. Hedge funds’ participation in 
credit risk transfer markets reduces the risks faced 
by supervised ﬁ  nancial institutions and provides 
liquidity for the transfer of this risk. However, their 
participation can also affect the ability of borrowers 
near default to work out their problems. In this way, 
hedge funds, through the use of derivatives, could 
ultimately contribute to either an increase or a 
decrease in defaults. The relative importance of these 
effects and other determinants of defaults is unclear, 
as is the appropriate supervisory response.
Chart 3
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3| M ARKET DISCIPLINE
AND THE INDIRECT APPROACH
Policy makers have subscribed to an indirect approach 
in dealing with many of the issues surrounding hedge 
funds. A key element of the indirect approach is the 
reliance upon market discipline –that is, relying on 
hedge fund investors, creditors, and counterparties 
to reward well-managed hedge funds and to reduce 
their exposure to risky, poorly managed hedge funds. 
To provide proper discipline, of course, market 
participants need to understand the activities of the 
hedge funds with which they do business, in order to 
assess their creditworthiness and risk-adjusted returns. 
While hedge funds are very reticent about sharing 
that kind of information, and are not usually required 
to do so by law or regulation, it is the responsibility 
of investors and counterparties to pressure funds to 
improve their disclosures. Well-managed funds should 
ﬁ  nd that it is to their advantage to be more open about 
their activities. Lack of transparency should come 
at a great price, measured by fewer investors and 
less favorable treatment by banks. Although basic 
information about hedge fund activities has begun 
to ﬂ  ow, investors and counterparties still too often 
obtain very limited disclosure from hedge funds.
Institutional investors should play a key role in 
promoting hedge fund transparency. A signiﬁ  cant 
portion of the growth in hedge funds over the past 
several years can be attributed to institutional 
investors’ demand for investment alternatives 
to standard long-only equity and ﬁ  xed-income 
investments. In 2006, investments in hedge funds 
by deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t pension plans, a portion of the 
pension management business, grew 69 percent to 
USD 50.5 billion.9
Institutional investors have a ﬁ  duciary responsibility 
to perform appropriate due diligence when 
investing in hedge funds. On their own and through 
investment advisors, they should conduct initial 
reviews and ongoing monitoring of hedge funds’ 
adherence to stated strategies, risk-management 
policies and processes, and internal operating 
controls. They should look particularly closely 
at funds’ internal policies and operating controls 
surrounding the use of leverage. Moreover, they 
need to increasingly require that the funds in which 
they invest meet various industry standards, such 
as valuation, reporting, and ethics standards issued 
by the Chartered Financial Analyst Institute and 
risk-management standards issued by the Managed 
Funds Association.10 To be sure, the extent of 
oversight by institutional investors varies. Larger 
investors may be able to devote more resources to the 
due-diligence process than smaller investors, and 
they may have more negotiating power in demanding 
transparency. Some observers have questioned the 
quality of due-diligence assessments conducted by 
advisors employed by smaller institutional funds 
and smaller public pension funds, particularly with 
regard to investments in funds of funds.11
Banks and other ﬁ  nancial institutions are also sources 
of market discipline because they must perform 
credit assessments before providing ﬁ  nancing or 
entering into derivatives transactions with hedge 
funds. These credit assessments usually follow a 
scorecard approach, in which the bank rates a fund 
for its management, leverage, risk measurement, 
liquidity, and strategy. Transparency can also play 
a role in a fund’s credit assessment. These credit 
assessments should determine the amount of risk a 
bank will take when ﬁ  nancing a hedge fund and are 
based on the information provided by hedge funds. 
Since this information is usually limited to basic 
ﬁ  nancial information, banks’ ability to determine 
the creditworthiness of hedge funds is also limited.
The evidence is mixed, but there do appear to be 
some areas where market discipline exerts itself. 
As sophisticated investors have poured money 
into the hedge fund industry, well-managed funds 
tend to grow, as good performance attracts new 
investors, while poorly managed funds tend to 
reduce in size or exit the market. Performance is 
thus one of the key determinants of turnover in 
the industry. As Table 2 illustrates, 2,187 hedge 
funds stopped reporting to a widely used database 
between 1999 and 2005.12 Meanwhile, none of 
9  Williamson (C.) (2007): “Solid growth pushes assets above USD 50 billion”, Pensions & Investments, January 22.
10  See CFA Institute: “Code of ethics and professional standards”, “CFA global investment performance standards”, “CFA asset manager code of professional conduct”; 
Managed Funds Association: “2005 Sound practices for hedge fund managers”; Government Financial Ofﬁ  cers Association: “Standards and practices for selection 
of asset managers”; Greenwich Roundtable: “Best practices in hedge fund investing: due diligence.”
11  Funds of funds are investment managers or hedge funds that aggregate investment funds from multiple investors and invest the proceeds with multiple hedge fund 
managers or managed accounts.  The fund of funds manager may allocate investments to several hedge funds that pursue the same strategy or multiple strategies. 
The goal of the initial investor is to achieve a diversiﬁ  ed portfolio of investments in the hedge fund sector or strategy.
12 Data  reﬂ  ect funds reporting to the Lipper TASS® Database.  This source can be considered a proxy for the number of funds that begin operation or shut down in 
a given year. However, it is imprecise, as there could be other reasons for a fund to change its reporting status.ARTICLES
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these hedge fund closures to date has resulted in 
a systemic crisis.
The evidence suggests that the indirect approach 
has been sufﬁ  cient. In the ten years since hedge 
funds emerged as major market participants, 
markets have demonstrated surprising resilience in 
the face of signiﬁ  cant disturbances, including the 
bursting of the technology bubble, the 2001-2002 
recession, the events of 9/11, two wars, and a wave 
of corporate scandals. But the most recent period 
has been remarkable for its stable economic growth, 
low market volatility, and low risk premiums. 
Considerable uncertainty remains about the ability 
of today’s ﬁ  nancial system to weather more pervasive 
macroeconomic or ﬁ  nancial shocks, and a lively 
debate continues over whether supervisors should 
oversee hedge fund activities more closely.
While investors, banks, and other ﬁ  nancial 
institutions now receive basic ﬁ  nancial information 
from hedge funds, transparency remains an issue. 
Hedge funds have a legitimate interest in protecting 
proprietary trading strategies, and a balance between 
the interests of investors, counterparties, and the 
hedge fund managers must be struck. Banks should 
see both quantitative and qualitative indicators of 
a hedge fund’s net asset value, risk exposures, and 
liquidity. Where this information is not forthcoming 
from a particular hedge fund, counterparties should 
tighten margin collateral and other credit terms. 
One size does not ﬁ  t all hedge funds: those that 
provide more information about their strategies 
may expand the investors who will do business with 
them and receive better credit terms; others may 
provide less information, protect their strategies 
from competitors, but limit their investor base and 
receive less favorable credit terms.
4| H EDGE FUNDS
AND BANKS’ RISK MANAGEMENT
Banking supervisors expect banking organizations 
to understand and properly manage the full gamut 
of credit, liquidity, and operational risks that hedge 
funds pose to their businesses. Supervisors expect 
banks and other ﬁ  nancial institutions to continually 
update their risk-management and business 
processes to keep pace with the activities of hedge 
funds and ﬁ  nancial innovation more generally. 
Underestimating the growth of a new product could 
mean lost proﬁ  t opportunities for a bank or, worse, 
substantial losses, if the bank has not put in place 
sufﬁ  cient controls or invested in the appropriate 
infrastructure. In some cases, banks may collectively 
underestimate the growth of a business or product, 
or may not have a ﬁ  rm grasp on the risks of and 
appropriate controls for a new business or product, 
thereby creating risks to the integrity of the broader 
ﬁ  nancial system.
4|1  Counterparty credit risk
Counterparty credit risk13 is the single most important 
risk for ﬁ  nancial institutions in their interaction with 
hedge funds. Calculating counterparty credit risk is 
complicated by its two-way nature; in other words, the 
net exposure between two institutions can change as 
13  Counterparty exposures arise from over-the-counter derivatives trading and ﬁ  nancing transactions such as equity margin lending, repurchase agreements,
and securities lending.  Hedge funds can also expose banks to traditional credit risk, in that banks can, but rarely do, extend loans directly to hedge funds. Banks 
may also be exposed to market risk by investing in the equity of hedge funds.
Table 2











1998 1,069 907 356 179
1999 1,187 1,005 297 199
2000 1,253 1,021 263 247
2001 1,960 1,705 956 272
2002 2,250 2,006 562 261
2003 2,682 2,415 693 284
2004 3,307 2,974 909 350
2005 4,248 3,691 1,291 574
2006* 4,621 3,900 947 738
* Data for 2006 reﬂ  ect information available from TASS as of January 12, 2007.ARTICLES
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markets prices rise and fall. With some instruments, 
either party may become the net debtor. A simple, 
but important, measure of counterparty credit risk 
is current exposure, which is the net exposure at 
current market values. This measure shows what 
the bank would lose if a hedge fund were to fail 
today. A more comprehensive measure is potential 
future exposure, which is the maximum amount to 
which an exposure could grow over a future time 
period with a high degree of statistical conﬁ  dence, 
if markets move against the hedge fund. Banks also 
“stress” potential exposures to estimate how they 
may grow under adverse market conditions.
Financial institutions limit their counterparty 
credit risk exposures through the use of collateral 
agreements, which require hedge funds to post 
collateral to ﬁ  nancial institutions daily to cover 
increases in current exposure resulting from market 
movements. These agreements often require the 
hedge fund to post additional collateral above the 
market value of the transaction at the inception 
of a trade to cover potential future exposure. This 
collateral is often known as initial margin. As a result 
of daily margining, counterparty credit risk to hedge 
funds is usually fully secured by collateral, enabling 
ﬁ  nancial institutions to offset losses in the event of 
a hedge fund default.
Still, systemic concerns remain. In particular, in a 
crisis, interlocking credit exposures would be the key 
mechanism by which risks would be transmitted from 
one institution to another, potentially transforming 
a run-of-the-mill disturbance into a systemic 
situation. The near failure in 1998 of Long-Term 
Capital Management (LTCM), a hedge fund that had 
taken large, highly leveraged, and illiquid market 
positions, galvanized supervisory interest in these 
issues. Industry and ﬁ  nancial supervisors agreed that 
excessive leverage and poor counterparty credit risk 
management as practiced by banks and other creditors 
raised concerns that market players seeking to sell 
at once could have negatively affected asset prices 
across markets, indirectly affecting other market 
participants such as mutual and pension funds.
Most banking supervisors incorporated sound 
practices promulgated by the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision (BCBS) into guidance and 
examination procedures applicable to capital market 
activities within a year of the LTCM incident.14
Today, supervisors in countries where banks have 
signiﬁ  cant dealings with hedge funds review banks’ 
risk-management policies and practices regarding 
hedge funds in regular onsite examinations.15 The 
Federal Reserve also periodically performs targeted 
reviews of speciﬁ  c credit risk management practices 
of banks that are major hedge fund counterparties. 
These targeted reviews examine in depth the banks’ 
practices against the BCBS and Federal Reserve sound 
practices guidance and note areas where practices 
should be strengthened. Supervisors continue to 
press for needed improvements in counterparty 
credit-risk management practices. Banks have made 
many improvements but are not yet at the point 
where they can become complacent.
4|2  Progress since 1998
By most accounts, banks and other dealers have 
substantially improved their management of 
counterparty credit risk since 1998. When conducting 
due diligence, it is now common practice for dealers 
to conduct onsite visits and maintain regular 
contact with hedge funds to monitor their activities 
and evaluate their risk-management capabilities. 
As a result, hedge funds generally provide more 
information about their activities to counterparties 
than they did in 1998, and banks today are less likely 
to be surprised by an LTCM-type incident. Dealer 
banks have also improved their measurement of 
counterparty credit risk. Techniques to estimate 
potential exposure are more sophisticated and 
model-driven.
The use of collateral for over-the-counter (OTC) 
derivative exposures has greatly increased; the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association16
reports that 63 percent of OTC derivative exposures 
were collateralized in 2005, up from 29 percent 
14  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1999): “Sound practices for banks’ interactions with highly leveraged institutions”, January.
15  The Federal Reserve, for example, routinely examines counterparty-risk management practices to ensure that banks:
  • perform appropriate due diligence and gather sufﬁ  cient information to assess the business, risk exposures, and credit standing of their counterparties;
  • establish, monitor, and enforce appropriate quantitative risk exposure limits for each of their counterparties;
  • use appropriate systems to measure and manage counterparty credit risk;
  • and deploy appropriate internal controls to ensure the integrity of their processes for managing counterparty credit risk.
16  International Swaps and Derivatives Association: “ISDA margin survey 2006.”ARTICLES
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in 2002. Dealers today generally require hedge 
funds to post collateral daily to cover current credit 
exposures and to post additional collateral, or initial 
margin, to cover potential exposures. Current and 
potential future exposures to counterparties are 
often calculated by product for each hedge fund and 
for each hedge fund family.
Information technology (IT) systems for managing 
counterparty credit risk have improved substantially 
since 1998. Banks have made signiﬁ  cant 
investments to comprehensively monitor and 
control counterparty exposures. These investments 
allow more sophisticated risk analyses on the part 
of banks.
Supervisory reviews suggest that banks’ counterparty 
credit exposures to hedge funds remain small relative 
to total assets or capital. In a recent supervisory 
survey, they represented only a small fraction of 
total current counterparty exposures at those banks 
for which data were available; potential exposures 
for banks’ entire hedge fund counterparty portfolios 
were within the range of exposures banks have to 
individual large nonﬁ  nancial corporate borrowers. 
The use of collateral agreements has kept the credit 
exposure to hedge funds small, even as assets under 
management by hedge funds have experienced 
substantial growth.
4|3  Need for further improvement
While these improvements indicate progress on the part 
of banks, their work is not yet done. In fact, because 
of the dynamic nature of hedge funds and innovations 
in the ﬁ  nancial markets, banks must continuously 
improve their counterparty credit risk management, 
and supervisors have identiﬁ  ed several areas where 
the need for improvement is most compelling. 
While management information systems have 
improved, the systems requirements for managing 
counterparty credit risk to hedge funds are demanding 
and complex.17 In the case of market-risk exposure, 
there is a single calculation of value-at-risk for all of a 
ﬁ  rm’s positions. In contrast, counterparty credit risk 
calculations must be made for many different 
counterparties,18 often for many different time horizons. 
Measurements of counterparty credit risk also require 
complex computer simulations. The management of 
counterparty credit risk is also complicated by hedge 
funds’ complex organizational structures, legal rights, 
collateral agreements, and frequent trading. It is 
important that banks develop the systems capability 
to regularly gather and analyze data across diverse 
internal systems to manage their counterparty credit 
risk to hedge funds. An ongoing concern is that banks 
may take inappropriate shortcuts or omit important 
elements of the IT system because it is so demanding. 
Therefore, supervisors must monitor the IT systems 
of supervised institutions to make sure they are up to 
date and capable of measuring and monitoring risk.
Another important element of managing counterparty 
credit risk is holding adequate capital for counterparty 
credit risk. International supervisors have updated the 
minimum capital to be held for this risk in the Basel II 
capital requirements.19 The new accord has provided 
a menu of approaches to the capital requirements 
for counterparty credit risk, made these capital 
requirements more sensitive to counterparties’ risk 
proﬁ  les, and added important incentives to mitigate 
counterparty credit risk through the use of collateral, 
collateral agreements, and netting agreements.
Banks also need to monitor the concentration of 
their counterparties’ positions in various markets. 
In September 2006, Amaranth Advisors LLC ran into 
difﬁ  culties because it was not sufﬁ  ciently diversiﬁ  ed 
and because it dominated some of the markets in which 
it traded. Dealer banks often monitor the size of their 
own positions relative to the markets in which they 
trade; this practice should be extended to the positions 
of their counterparties as well.
Other supervisory concerns about counterparty 
credit risk management practices remain. First, 
supervisors are concerned about evidence that 
competition for hedge fund business among banks 
has led to diminished initial margin levels. They 
are particularly concerned when the reduction in 
initial margin does not seem to be justiﬁ  ed by a 
reduction in risk. Second, they are concerned about 
whether banks are measuring their counterparty 
exposures accurately, given the complexity of 
17  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005): “The application of Basel II to trading activities and the treatment of double default effects”, July, describes the 
operational practices regarding the management of counterparty credit risk that supervisors expect banks to follow.
18  A single counterparty may have many different exposures associated with it, for example, if netting rights across some products are not secured. For this reason 
there are usually more exposures than counterparties.
19  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005): “The application of Basel II to trading activities and the treatment of double default effects”, July.ARTICLES
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transactions in which hedge funds participate. 
Third, they are concerned about the amount and 
quality of stress testing. The discipline of stress 
testing is critical because it requires ﬁ  rms  to 
imagine and prepare for low-probability scenarios 
with which they may have no recent experience. 
Supervisors would like to see broader use of 
stress-testing at the level of each hedge fund 
counterparty and aggregated across hedge fund 
customers. Lastly, the amount of credit exposure to 
a hedge fund should reﬂ  ect the quantity and quality 
of information about the fund, the extent to which 
exposure is mitigated through margin and other 
credit terms, and the capital the bank has allocated 
to support the exposure. Recent targeted supervisory 
reviews by the Federal Reserve, in conjunction with 
other national and international supervisors, have 
focused particular emphasis on these issues.
4|4 Market-liquidity  risk
In addition to the direct counterparty and other 
credit risks hedge funds may pose to the supervised 
institutions at the core of the ﬁ  nancial system, 
supervisors are also concerned about the indirect risks 
associated with a decline in asset-market liquidity 
resulting from the failure or winding down of one or 
more major hedge funds. In many markets, hedge 
funds are key liquidity providers and are generally 
considered to help disperse risk more widely.
A particular concern is that, in illiquid markets, 
hedge funds may be forced to sell positions to meet 
margin requirements, driving down market prices. 
In severe cases, the hedge fund may drive down the 
value of existing positions by more than they receive 
from the original sale, forcing further sales.20 These 
“liquidity black holes” have diverse causes, and they 
have generated considerable academic interest.21
When counterparties have concentrated positions, 
losses on these positions are more likely to lead to 
substantial losses in liquidity. Meanwhile, the size 
and dominance of hedge funds in some markets raise 
concerns about disorderly exits.
Because of such risks, supervisors focus on banks’  ability 
to identify and mitigate the risks associated with a 
sharp decline in market liquidity. Banks and other 
dealers need to deepen their understanding of their 
own sensitivity to market shocks by strengthening 
their stress-testing and scenario-analysis capabilities, 
particularly with respect to scenarios that could 
generate simultaneous losses for their counterparties 
and their own market positions. Banks should be able 
to aggregate and stress-test by key risk factor across 
their portfolio of direct and counterparty exposures. 
They also need to develop a deeper understanding 
of the controls and practices that other leveraged 
counterparties utilize to manage market-liquidity risk 
and funding-liquidity risk.
4|5 Operational  risk
Supervisors have also been concerned about 
systemic risks that may arise from weaknesses in the 
clearing and settlement infrastructure that supports 
hedge fund trading activities. As often happens in 
fast-growing markets, trading in a number of markets 
has exceeded ﬁ  rms’ abilities to appropriately update 
their infrastructure and processes. In particular, the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) and the 
Financial Services Authority in the United Kingdom 
became aware of a number of problems in 
the clearing and settlement infrastructure for 
over-the-counter derivatives, particularly for credit 
derivatives, following routine horizontal counterparty 
credit risk management reviews. Subsequently, in 
July 2005 a private-sector group, the Counterparty 
Risk Management Policy Group II, issued a report 
noting (1) a growing backlog of unsigned trade 
conﬁ   rmations and (2) an increasingly common 
practice among dealers of accepting assignments of 
trades by one counterparty without the prior consent 
of the other, despite requirements to document trades 
and to obtain prior consent.22
In September 2005, fourteen major US and foreign 
derivatives dealers met at the instigation of FRBNY 
and agreed to address these issues. The dealer 
group quickly recorded substantial progress. By 
September 2006, the fourteen dealers had nearly 
eliminated unauthorized assignments, reduced by 
85 percent total credit derivative conﬁ  rmations 
outstanding for more than 30 days, and raised 
the portion of credit derivative trades conﬁ  rmed 
electronically from 47 percent to 82 percent. The 
20  Managed Funds Association: “MFA’s 2005 sound practices for hedge fund managers”, see pp. AI-13: “The liquidity crisis cycle”.
21  Persaud (A.) (2003): “Liquidity black holes: understanding, quantifying and managing ﬁ  nancial liquidity risk”, London: Risk Books.
22  Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group II (2005): “Toward greater ﬁ  nancial stability: a private sector perspective”, July 27.ARTICLES
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group of dealers also worked with the International 
Swaps and Derivatives Association to draft an 
off-the-shelf protocol for settlement of credit default 
swaps via an auction process in the event of default 
–a protocol that is now ready to be used during the 
next credit event.
Another result of these meetings was the Depository 
Trust and Clearing Corporation’s creation, in 2006,
of an industry trade information warehouse 
and support infrastructure to standardize and 
automate processing of credit derivatives. To make 
the warehouse useful in a range of post-trade 
processes, such as payment calculations, portfolio 
reconciliations, collateral processing, and credit-event
settlement, existing trades are being back-loaded 
into the warehouse database.
Much remains to be done. The dealer group, which is 
adding new members, met again in September 2006 
at FRBNY and promised further work on automating 
processes and tackling backlogs in other derivative 
products, focusing especially on equity derivatives. 
Supervisors continue to monitor their progress.ARTICLES
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23  Steel (R. K.) (2007): “Remarks of under secretary for domestic ﬁ  nance Robert K. Steel on private pools of capital,” February 27.
24  Ferguson (R.) (2006): “Financial regulation: seeking the middle way,” Fourth Joint Central Bank Research Conference on Risk Management and Systemic Risk, 
Frankfurt, Germany, November.
Policy makers have addressed the systemic and ﬁ  nancial stability concerns surrounding hedge funds by 
favoring an indirect approach. One key element of that approach focuses on ensuring the integrity of the 
risk management and capital adequacy of the regulated counterparties that extend ﬁ  nancing to hedge 
funds. As hedge funds’ largest creditors, these institutions, along with investors, are best positioned to 
monitor hedge fund risks given their clear ﬁ  nancial incentives. Indeed, the President’s Working Group on 
Financial Markets recently set forth some fundamental principles regarding private pools of capital. The 
philosophy behind these principles is to encourage and improve disclosure by pools and managers and to 
strengthen market and counterparty discipline, without discouraging innovation by requiring the disclosure 
of proprietary information.23
Although this approach has served us well, the globalization of the capital markets places even greater 
emphasis on the need for supervisors to coordinate on an international basis. The global reach of hedge 
funds under the current supervisory approach requires coordinated efforts to address various types of 
collective action issues. The FRBNY-led effort to clean up the processing of OTC derivatives is a case in 
which collective action has helped to resolve an industry-wide problem.
It can be difﬁ  cult to determine when a supervisory collective-action problem exists. This is particularly true in 
the case of ﬁ  nancial innovations that may or may not gain market acceptance. For this reason, supervisors 
have moved methodically in their approaches to credit-risk transfer and hedge funds. There is a strong 
desire to allow the beneﬁ  ts of these innovations to unfold but also to be vigilant in protecting against any 
potential systemic problems, either by taking action individually or collectively.24 Innovations by ﬁ  nancial 
institutions have contributed signiﬁ  cantly to the development of the credit risk transfer markets. Supervision 
of these markets has largely followed their development; supervisors have addressed and will continue to 
address concerns in the securitization and derivatives markets as they develop. 
The ability of institutional investors and banks to exercise effective market discipline requires that they obtain 
adequate information about the hedge funds with which they do business. The indirect approach to regulating 
hedge funds relies on these important players to seek information about a hedge fund’s management, 
strategy, positions, and leverage while respecting the proprietary nature of the hedge fund’s investment 
strategies. Where sufﬁ  cient information is not forthcoming from a particular hedge fund, banks should 
tighten margin, collateral, and other credit terms. Investors need to ascertain whether the information 
provided is sufﬁ  cient for them to make an investment allocation to that hedge fund.  
The Amaranth incident illustrated the risks when counterparties do not sufﬁ  ciently monitor the activities of 
a hedge fund with highly concentrated market positions. While the incident did not have systemic effects, 
it took place under benign market and economic conditions. Supervisors and market participants have no 
grounds for complacency. As the role of hedge funds continues to evolve, banking supervisors and central 
banks must continue to monitor counterparty credit risk management practices and systemic infrastructure 
issues and, periodically, to reevaluate the effectiveness of banks’ management of counterparty credit risk.